[x86] USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write (CVE-2016-3955)
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@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ linux (4.5.1-2) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
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[ Salvatore Bonaccorso ]
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* [x86] xen: suppress hugetlbfs in PV guests (CVE-2016-3961)
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* [x86] USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write (CVE-2016-3955)
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[ Ben Hutchings ]
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* fs: Consolidate softdep declarations in each module
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@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
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From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2016 18:00:29 +0000
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Subject: USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
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Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb
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Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
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usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
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packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
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part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
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urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
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Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
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preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
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Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
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Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
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Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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---
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drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | 11 +++++++++++
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1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
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index facaaf0..e40da77 100644
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--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
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+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
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@@ -741,6 +741,17 @@ int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
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if (!(size > 0))
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return 0;
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+ if (size > urb->transfer_buffer_length) {
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+ /* should not happen, probably malicious packet */
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+ if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
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+ usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
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+ return 0;
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+ } else {
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+ usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
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+ return -EPIPE;
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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ret = usbip_recv(ud->tcp_socket, urb->transfer_buffer, size);
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if (ret != size) {
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dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "recv xbuf, %d\n", ret);
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--
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2.1.4
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@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ bugfix/all/netfilter-x_tables-make-sure-e-next_offset-covers-re.patch
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bugfix/all/ipv4-don-t-do-expensive-useless-work-during-inetdev-.patch
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bugfix/x86/x86-mm-32-enable-full-randomization-on-i386-and-x86_.patch
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bugfix/x86/x86-xen-suppress-hugetlbfs-in-PV-guests.patch
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bugfix/all/USB-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-write.patch
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# Tools bug fixes
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bugfix/all/usbip-document-tcp-wrappers.patch
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