linux/debian/patches-debian/security-keys-destructor-oo...

56 lines
2.0 KiB
Diff

commit 94efe72f762e2c147d8146d637d5ece5614c8d94
tree 002e4719541ad838342e01a5f8ff63ae0a618b29
parent bcf945d36fa0598f41ac4ad46a9dc43135460263
author David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> 1123186027 -0700
committer Linus Torvalds <torvalds@g5.osdl.org> 1123186274 -0700
[PATCH] Destruction of failed keyring oopses
The attached patch makes sure that a keyring that failed to instantiate
properly is destroyed without oopsing [CAN-2005-2099].
The problem occurs in three stages:
(1) The key allocator initialises the type-specific data to all zeroes. In
the case of a keyring, this will become a link in the keyring name list
when the keyring is instantiated.
(2) If a user (any user) attempts to add a keyring with anything other than
an empty payload, the keyring instantiation function will fail with an
error and won't add the keyring to the name list.
(3) The keyring's destructor then sees that the keyring has a description
(name) and tries to remove the keyring from the name list, which oopses
because the link pointers are both zero.
This bug permits any user to take down a box trivially.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
I:100644 100644 a1f6bac647a1c3a673bfbb2b4b03d0556cc9be88 9c208c756df8136cbaa0a06f5442af60c712ae6d M security/keys/keyring.c
Key:
S: Skipped
I: Included Included verbatim
D: Deleted Manually deleted by subsequent user edit
R: Revised Manually revised by subsequent user edit
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -201,7 +201,11 @@ static void keyring_destroy(struct key *
if (keyring->description) {
write_lock(&keyring_name_lock);
- list_del(&keyring->type_data.link);
+
+ if (keyring->type_data.link.next != NULL &&
+ !list_empty(&keyring->type_data.link))
+ list_del(&keyring->type_data.link);
+
write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
}