From 3285feab53ccae8ed7e6abd0dc335145caff5102 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kersten Jeremy Date: Wed, 9 Apr 2014 17:16:59 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] [FIX] Allow missing opcodes, harden check for private attributes (dunder), check inside embedded code objects. bzr revid: jke@openerp.com-20140409151659-xwttchbtbj02v1w7 --- openerp/sql_db.py | 8 ++-- openerp/tools/safe_eval.py | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/openerp/sql_db.py b/openerp/sql_db.py index 9844de48d2a..1c57b729569 100644 --- a/openerp/sql_db.py +++ b/openerp/sql_db.py @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ class Cursor(object): self.sql_log_count = 0 self.__closed = True # avoid the call of close() (by __del__) if an exception # is raised by any of the following initialisations - self._pool = pool + self.__pool = pool self.dbname = dbname # Whether to enable snapshot isolation level for this cursor. @@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ class Cursor(object): chosen_template = tools.config['db_template'] templates_list = tuple(set(['template0', 'template1', 'postgres', chosen_template])) keep_in_pool = self.dbname not in templates_list - self._pool.give_back(self._cnx, keep_in_pool=keep_in_pool) + self.__pool.give_back(self._cnx, keep_in_pool=keep_in_pool) @check def autocommit(self, on): @@ -476,12 +476,12 @@ class Connection(object): def __init__(self, pool, dbname): self.dbname = dbname - self._pool = pool + self.__pool = pool def cursor(self, serialized=True): cursor_type = serialized and 'serialized ' or '' _logger.debug('create %scursor to %r', cursor_type, self.dbname) - return Cursor(self._pool, self.dbname, serialized=serialized) + return Cursor(self.__pool, self.dbname, serialized=serialized) # serialized_cursor is deprecated - cursors are serialized by default serialized_cursor = cursor diff --git a/openerp/tools/safe_eval.py b/openerp/tools/safe_eval.py index b99de385af3..aa6abccd549 100644 --- a/openerp/tools/safe_eval.py +++ b/openerp/tools/safe_eval.py @@ -66,7 +66,8 @@ _SAFE_OPCODES = _EXPR_OPCODES.union(set(opmap[x] for x in [ 'MAKE_FUNCTION', 'SLICE+0', 'SLICE+1', 'SLICE+2', 'SLICE+3', # New in Python 2.7 - http://bugs.python.org/issue4715 : 'JUMP_IF_FALSE_OR_POP', 'JUMP_IF_TRUE_OR_POP', 'POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE', - 'POP_JUMP_IF_TRUE', 'SETUP_EXCEPT', 'END_FINALLY' + 'POP_JUMP_IF_TRUE', 'SETUP_EXCEPT', 'END_FINALLY', 'LOAD_FAST', + 'LOAD_GLOBAL', # Only allows access to restricted globals ] if x in opmap)) _logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) @@ -81,16 +82,65 @@ def _get_opcodes(codeobj): [100, 100, 23, 100, 100, 102, 103, 83] """ i = 0 - opcodes = [] byte_codes = codeobj.co_code while i < len(byte_codes): code = ord(byte_codes[i]) - opcodes.append(code) + yield code + if code >= HAVE_ARGUMENT: i += 3 else: i += 1 - return opcodes + +def assert_no_dunder_name(code_obj, expr): + """ assert_no_dunder_name(code_obj, expr) -> None + + Asserts that the code object does not refer to any "dunder name" + (__$name__), so that safe_eval prevents access to any internal-ish Python + attribute or method (both are loaded via LOAD_ATTR which uses a name, not a + const or a var). + + Checks that no such name exists in the provided code object (co_names). + + :param code_obj: code object to name-validate + :type code_obj: CodeType + :param str expr: expression corresponding to the code object, for debugging + purposes + :raises NameError: in case a forbidden name (containing two underscores) + is found in ``code_obj`` + + .. note:: actually forbids every name containing 2 underscores + """ + for name in code_obj.co_names: + if "__" in name: + raise NameError('Access to forbidden name %r (%r)' % (name, expr)) + +def assert_valid_codeobj(allowed_codes, code_obj, expr): + """ Asserts that the provided code object validates against the bytecode + and name constraints. + + Recursively validates the code objects stored in its co_consts in case + lambdas are being created/used (lambdas generate their own separated code + objects and don't live in the root one) + + :param allowed_codes: list of permissible bytecode instructions + :type allowed_codes: set(int) + :param code_obj: code object to name-validate + :type code_obj: CodeType + :param str expr: expression corresponding to the code object, for debugging + purposes + :raises ValueError: in case of forbidden bytecode in ``code_obj`` + :raises NameError: in case a forbidden name (containing two underscores) + is found in ``code_obj`` + """ + assert_no_dunder_name(code_obj, expr) + for opcode in _get_opcodes(code_obj): + if opcode not in allowed_codes: + raise ValueError( + "opcode %s not allowed (%r)" % (opname[opcode], expr)) + for const in code_obj.co_consts: + if isinstance(const, CodeType): + assert_valid_codeobj(allowed_codes, const, 'lambda') def test_expr(expr, allowed_codes, mode="eval"): """test_expr(expression, allowed_codes[, mode]) -> code_object @@ -105,15 +155,14 @@ def test_expr(expr, allowed_codes, mode="eval"): # eval() does not like leading/trailing whitespace expr = expr.strip() code_obj = compile(expr, "", mode) - except (SyntaxError, TypeError): + except (SyntaxError, TypeError, ValueError): _logger.debug('Invalid eval expression', exc_info=True) raise except Exception: _logger.debug('Disallowed or invalid eval expression', exc_info=True) raise ValueError("%s is not a valid expression" % expr) - for code in _get_opcodes(code_obj): - if code not in allowed_codes: - raise ValueError("opcode %s not allowed (%r)" % (opname[code], expr)) + + assert_valid_codeobj(allowed_codes, code_obj, expr) return code_obj @@ -182,19 +231,13 @@ def safe_eval(expr, globals_dict=None, locals_dict=None, mode="eval", nocopy=Fal This can be used to e.g. evaluate an OpenERP domain expression from an untrusted source. - Throws TypeError, SyntaxError or ValueError (not allowed) accordingly. - - >>> safe_eval("__import__('sys').modules") - Traceback (most recent call last): - ... - ValueError: opcode LOAD_NAME not allowed - + :throws TypeError: If the expression provided is a code object + :throws SyntaxError: If the expression provided is not valid Python + :throws NameError: If the expression provided accesses forbidden names + :throws ValueError: If the expression provided uses forbidden bytecode """ if isinstance(expr, CodeType): - raise ValueError("safe_eval does not allow direct evaluation of code objects.") - - if '__subclasses__' in expr: - raise ValueError('expression not allowed (__subclasses__)') + raise TypeError("safe_eval does not allow direct evaluation of code objects.") if globals_dict is None: globals_dict = {}