wpa-supplicant: Fix CVE-2015-4141, CVE-2015-4143, CVE-2015-4144, CVE-2015-4145, CVE-2015-4146
wpa-supplicant: backport patch to fix CVE-2015-4141, CVE-2015-4143, CVE-2015-4144, CVE-2015-4145, CVE-2015-4146 Backport patch to fix CVE-2015-4141, CVE-2015-4143, CVE-2015-4144, CVE-2015-4145, CVE-2015-4146. This patch is originally from: For CVE-2015-4141: http://w1.fi/security/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch For CVE-2015-4143: http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch For CVE-2015-4144 and CVE-2015-4145: http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch For CVE-2015-4146: http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch (From OE-Core rev: ce16e95de05db24e4e4132660d793cc7b1d890b9) Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin at jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Fan Xin
Richard Purdie
parent
177d463a8a
commit
d31f89bd81
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@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
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From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit
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and Confirm
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The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
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checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
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overflow when processing an invalid message.
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Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
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processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
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make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
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message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
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Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
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reporting this issue.
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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index f2b0926..a629437 100644
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--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
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BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
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u16 offset;
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u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
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+ size_t prime_len, order_len;
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+
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+ if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
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+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
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+ goto fin;
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+ }
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+
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+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
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+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
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+
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+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
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+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
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+ (unsigned int) payload_len,
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+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
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+ goto fin;
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+ }
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if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
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((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
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@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
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u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
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int offset;
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+ if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
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+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
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+ goto fin;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
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+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
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+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
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+ goto fin;
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+ }
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+
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/*
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* first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
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* prf
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--
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1.9.1
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@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
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From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
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strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
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resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
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result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
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argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
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This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
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has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
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would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
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upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
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(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
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Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
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rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
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larger than the maximum configured body length.
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Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
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reporting this issue.
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
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1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
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index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644
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--- a/src/wps/httpread.c
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+++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
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@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
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if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
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goto bad;
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h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
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+ if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
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+ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
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+ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
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+ h->chunk_size);
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+ goto bad;
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+ }
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/* throw away chunk header
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* so we have only real data
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*/
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--
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1.9.1
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@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
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From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit
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and Confirm
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The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
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checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
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overflow when processing an invalid message.
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Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
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processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
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make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
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message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
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Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
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reporting this issue.
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
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1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
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index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644
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--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
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+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
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@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
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BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
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EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
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int res = 0;
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+ size_t prime_len, order_len;
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
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+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
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+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
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+
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+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
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+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
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+ (unsigned int) payload_len,
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+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
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+ goto fin;
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+ }
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+
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if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
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((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
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((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
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@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
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u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
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int offset;
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+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
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+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
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+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
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+ goto fin;
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+ }
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+
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/* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
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grp = htons(data->group_num);
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ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
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--
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1.9.1
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@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
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From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
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reassembly
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The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
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Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
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prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
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have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
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as a huge positive integer.
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In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
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before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
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potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++
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1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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index a629437..1d2079b 100644
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--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
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* if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
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*/
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if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
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+ if (len < 2) {
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
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+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
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+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
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"total length = %d", tot_len);
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if (tot_len > 15000)
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return NULL;
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+ if (data->inbuf) {
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
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+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
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+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
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if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
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--
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1.9.1
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@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
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From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
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reassembly
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The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
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Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
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prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
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have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
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as a huge positive integer.
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In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
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before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
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potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++
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1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
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index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644
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--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
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+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
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@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
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* the first fragment has a total length
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*/
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if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
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+ if (len < 2) {
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
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+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
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+ return;
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+ }
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tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
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"length = %d", tot_len);
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if (tot_len > 15000)
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return;
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+ if (data->inbuf) {
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
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+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
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+ return;
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+ }
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data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
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if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "
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--
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1.9.1
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@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
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From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
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The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding
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whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This
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fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid
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for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in
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triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process
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due to invalid buffer allocation.
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 +
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
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diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644
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--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
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/*
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* we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
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*/
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+ lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
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len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
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if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
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resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,
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--
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1.9.1
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@ -25,6 +25,12 @@ SRC_URI = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \
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file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \
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file://99_wpa_supplicant \
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file://0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch \
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file://0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch \
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file://0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch \
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file://0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch \
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file://0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch \
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file://0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch \
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file://0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch \
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"
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SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f0037dbe03897dcaf2ad2722e659095d"
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SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "058dc832c096139a059e6df814080f50251a8d313c21b13364c54a1e70109122"
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