asterisk/res/res_pjsip_stir_shaken.c

383 lines
11 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*
* Asterisk -- An open source telephony toolkit.
*
* Copyright (C) 2020, Sangoma Technologies Corporation
*
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
* Ben Ford <bford@sangoma.com>
*
* See http://www.asterisk.org for more information about
* the Asterisk project. Please do not directly contact
* any of the maintainers of this project for assistance;
* the project provides a web site, mailing lists and IRC
* channels for your use.
*
* This program is free software, distributed under the terms of
* the GNU General Public License Version 2. See the LICENSE file
* at the top of the source tree.
*/
/*** MODULEINFO
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
<depend>pjproject</depend>
<depend>res_pjsip</depend>
<depend>res_pjsip_session</depend>
<depend>res_stir_shaken</depend>
<support_level>core</support_level>
***/
#include "asterisk.h"
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
#include "asterisk/res_pjsip.h"
#include "asterisk/res_pjsip_session.h"
#include "asterisk/module.h"
#include "asterisk/res_stir_shaken.h"
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
/*!
* \brief Get the attestation from the payload
*
* \param json_str The JSON string representation of the payload
*
* \retval Empty string on failure
* \retval The attestation on success
*/
static char *get_attestation_from_payload(const char *json_str)
{
RAII_VAR(struct ast_json *, json, NULL, ast_json_free);
char *attestation;
json = ast_json_load_string(json_str, NULL);
attestation = (char *)ast_json_string_get(ast_json_object_get(json, "attest"));
if (!ast_strlen_zero(attestation)) {
return attestation;
}
return "";
}
/*!
* \brief Compare the caller ID from the INVITE with the one in the payload
*
* \param json_str The JSON string represntation of the payload
*
* \retval -1 on failure
* \retval 0 on success
*/
static int compare_caller_id(char *caller_id, const char *json_str)
{
RAII_VAR(struct ast_json *, json, NULL, ast_json_free);
char *caller_id_other;
json = ast_json_load_string(json_str, NULL);
caller_id_other = (char *)ast_json_string_get(ast_json_object_get(
ast_json_object_get(json, "orig"), "tn"));
if (strcmp(caller_id, caller_id_other)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*!
* \brief Compare the current timestamp with the one in the payload. If the difference
* is greater than the signature timeout, it's not valid anymore
*
* \param json_str The JSON string representation of the payload
*
* \retval -1 on failure
* \retval 0 on success
*/
static int compare_timestamp(const char *json_str)
{
RAII_VAR(struct ast_json *, json, NULL, ast_json_free);
long int timestamp;
struct timeval now = ast_tvnow();
#ifdef TEST_FRAMEWORK
ast_debug(3, "Ignoring STIR/SHAKEN timestamp\n");
return 0;
#endif
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
json = ast_json_load_string(json_str, NULL);
timestamp = ast_json_integer_get(ast_json_object_get(json, "iat"));
if (now.tv_sec - timestamp > ast_stir_shaken_get_signature_timeout()) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*!
* \internal
* \brief Session supplement callback on an incoming INVITE request
*
* When we receive an INVITE, check it for STIR/SHAKEN information and
* decide what to do from there
*
* \param session The session that has received an INVITE
* \param rdata The incoming INVITE
*/
static int stir_shaken_incoming_request(struct ast_sip_session *session, pjsip_rx_data *rdata)
{
static const pj_str_t identity_str = { "Identity", 8 };
char *identity_hdr_val;
char *encoded_val;
struct ast_channel *chan = session->channel;
char *caller_id = session->id.number.str;
RAII_VAR(char *, header, NULL, ast_free);
RAII_VAR(char *, payload, NULL, ast_free);
char *signature;
char *algorithm;
char *public_cert_url;
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
char *attestation;
int mismatch = 0;
struct ast_stir_shaken_payload *ss_payload;
if (!session->endpoint->stir_shaken) {
return 0;
}
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
identity_hdr_val = ast_sip_rdata_get_header_value(rdata, identity_str);
if (ast_strlen_zero(identity_hdr_val)) {
ast_stir_shaken_add_verification(chan, caller_id, "", AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT);
return 0;
}
encoded_val = strtok_r(identity_hdr_val, ".", &identity_hdr_val);
header = ast_base64url_decode_string(encoded_val);
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
if (ast_strlen_zero(header)) {
ast_stir_shaken_add_verification(chan, caller_id, "", AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED);
return 0;
}
encoded_val = strtok_r(identity_hdr_val, ".", &identity_hdr_val);
payload = ast_base64url_decode_string(encoded_val);
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
if (ast_strlen_zero(payload)) {
ast_stir_shaken_add_verification(chan, caller_id, "", AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED);
return 0;
}
/* It's fine to leave the signature encoded */
signature = strtok_r(identity_hdr_val, ";", &identity_hdr_val);
if (ast_strlen_zero(signature)) {
ast_stir_shaken_add_verification(chan, caller_id, "", AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED);
return 0;
}
/* Trim "info=<" to get public cert URL */
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
strtok_r(identity_hdr_val, "<", &identity_hdr_val);
public_cert_url = strtok_r(identity_hdr_val, ">", &identity_hdr_val);
if (ast_strlen_zero(public_cert_url)) {
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
ast_stir_shaken_add_verification(chan, caller_id, "", AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED);
return 0;
}
/* Make sure the public URL is actually a URL */
if (!ast_begins_with(public_cert_url, "http")) {
ast_stir_shaken_add_verification(chan, caller_id, "", AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED);
return 0;
}
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
algorithm = strtok_r(identity_hdr_val, ";", &identity_hdr_val);
if (ast_strlen_zero(algorithm)) {
ast_stir_shaken_add_verification(chan, caller_id, "", AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED);
return 0;
}
attestation = get_attestation_from_payload(payload);
ss_payload = ast_stir_shaken_verify(header, payload, signature, algorithm, public_cert_url);
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
if (!ss_payload) {
ast_stir_shaken_add_verification(chan, caller_id, attestation, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED);
return 0;
}
ast_stir_shaken_payload_free(ss_payload);
mismatch |= compare_caller_id(caller_id, payload);
mismatch |= compare_timestamp(payload);
if (mismatch) {
ast_stir_shaken_add_verification(chan, caller_id, attestation, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
ast_stir_shaken_add_verification(chan, caller_id, attestation, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED);
return 0;
}
static int add_identity_header(const struct ast_sip_session *session, pjsip_tx_data *tdata)
{
static const pj_str_t identity_str = { "Identity", 8 };
pjsip_generic_string_hdr *identity_hdr;
pj_str_t identity_val;
pjsip_fromto_hdr *old_identity;
pjsip_fromto_hdr *to;
pjsip_sip_uri *uri;
char *signature;
char *public_cert_url;
struct ast_json *header;
struct ast_json *payload;
char *dumped_string;
RAII_VAR(char *, dest_tn, NULL, ast_free);
RAII_VAR(struct ast_json *, json, NULL, ast_json_free);
RAII_VAR(struct ast_stir_shaken_payload *, ss_payload, NULL, ast_stir_shaken_payload_free);
RAII_VAR(char *, encoded_header, NULL, ast_free);
RAII_VAR(char *, encoded_payload, NULL, ast_free);
RAII_VAR(char *, combined_str, NULL, ast_free);
size_t combined_size;
old_identity = pjsip_msg_find_hdr_by_name(tdata->msg, &identity_str, NULL);
if (old_identity) {
return 0;
}
to = pjsip_msg_find_hdr(tdata->msg, PJSIP_H_TO, NULL);
if (!to) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Failed to find To header while adding STIR/SHAKEN Identity header\n");
return -1;
}
uri = pjsip_uri_get_uri(to->uri);
if (!uri) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Failed to retrieve URI from To header while adding STIR/SHAKEN Identity header\n");
return -1;
}
dest_tn = ast_malloc(uri->user.slen + 1);
if (!dest_tn) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Failed to allocate memory for STIR/SHAKEN dest->tn\n");
return -1;
}
ast_copy_pj_str(dest_tn, &uri->user, uri->user.slen + 1);
/* x5u (public key URL), attestation, and origid will be added by ast_stir_shaken_sign */
json = ast_json_pack("{s: {s: s, s: s, s: s}, s: {s: {s: s}, s: {s: s}}}",
"header", "alg", "ES256", "ppt", "shaken", "typ", "passport",
"payload", "dest", "tn", dest_tn, "orig", "tn",
session->id.number.str);
if (!json) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Failed to allocate memory for STIR/SHAKEN JSON\n");
return -1;
}
ss_payload = ast_stir_shaken_sign(json);
if (!ss_payload) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Failed to allocate memory for STIR/SHAKEN payload\n");
return -1;
}
header = ast_json_object_get(json, "header");
dumped_string = ast_json_dump_string(header);
encoded_header = ast_base64url_encode_string(dumped_string);
ast_json_free(dumped_string);
if (!encoded_header) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Failed to encode STIR/SHAKEN header\n");
return -1;
}
payload = ast_json_object_get(json, "payload");
dumped_string = ast_json_dump_string(payload);
encoded_payload = ast_base64url_encode_string(dumped_string);
ast_json_free(dumped_string);
if (!encoded_payload) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Failed to encode STIR/SHAKEN payload\n");
return -1;
}
signature = (char *)ast_stir_shaken_payload_get_signature(ss_payload);
public_cert_url = ast_stir_shaken_payload_get_public_cert_url(ss_payload);
/* The format for the identity header:
* header.payload.signature;info=<public_cert_url>alg=STIR_SHAKEN_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM;ppt=STIR_SHAKEN_PPT
*/
combined_size = strlen(encoded_header) + 1 + strlen(encoded_payload) + 1
+ strlen(signature) + strlen(";info=<>alg=;ppt=") + strlen(public_cert_url)
+ strlen(STIR_SHAKEN_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM) + strlen(STIR_SHAKEN_PPT) + 1;
combined_str = ast_calloc(1, combined_size);
if (!combined_str) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Failed to allocate memory for STIR/SHAKEN identity string\n");
return -1;
}
snprintf(combined_str, combined_size, "%s.%s.%s;info=<%s>alg=%s;ppt=%s", encoded_header,
encoded_payload, signature, public_cert_url, STIR_SHAKEN_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, STIR_SHAKEN_PPT);
identity_val = pj_str(combined_str);
identity_hdr = pjsip_generic_string_hdr_create(tdata->pool, &identity_str, &identity_val);
if (!identity_hdr) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Failed to create STIR/SHAKEN Identity header\n");
return -1;
}
pjsip_msg_add_hdr(tdata->msg, (pjsip_hdr *)identity_hdr);
return 0;
}
static void add_date_header(const struct ast_sip_session *session, pjsip_tx_data *tdata)
{
static const pj_str_t date_str = { "Date", 4 };
pjsip_fromto_hdr *old_date;
old_date = pjsip_msg_find_hdr_by_name(tdata->msg, &date_str, NULL);
if (old_date) {
ast_debug(3, "Found old STIR/SHAKEN date header, no need to add one\n");
return;
}
ast_sip_add_date_header(tdata);
}
static void stir_shaken_outgoing_request(struct ast_sip_session *session, pjsip_tx_data *tdata)
{
if (!session->endpoint->stir_shaken) {
return;
}
if (ast_strlen_zero(session->id.number.str) && session->id.number.valid) {
return;
}
/* If adding the Identity header fails for some reason, there's no point
* adding the Date header.
*/
if ((add_identity_header(session, tdata)) != 0) {
return;
}
add_date_header(session, tdata);
}
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
static struct ast_sip_session_supplement stir_shaken_supplement = {
.method = "INVITE",
.priority = AST_SIP_SUPPLEMENT_PRIORITY_CHANNEL + 1, /* Run AFTER channel creation */
.incoming_request = stir_shaken_incoming_request,
.outgoing_request = stir_shaken_outgoing_request,
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
};
static int unload_module(void)
{
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
ast_sip_session_unregister_supplement(&stir_shaken_supplement);
return 0;
}
static int load_module(void)
{
res_stir_shaken: Add inbound INVITE support. Integrated STIR/SHAKEN support with incoming INVITES. Upon receiving an INVITE, the Identity header is retrieved, parsing the message to verify the signature. If any of the parsing fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_NOT_PRESENT will be added to the channel for this caller ID. If verification itself fails, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_SIGNATURE_FAILED will be added. If anything in the payload does not line up with the SIP signaling, AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_MISMATCH will be added. If all of the above steps pass, then AST_STIR_SHAKEN_VERIFY_PASSED will be added, completing the verification process. A new config option has been added to the general section for stir_shaken.conf. "signature_timeout" is the amount of time a signature will be considered valid. If an INVITE is received and the amount of time between when it was received and when it was signed is greater than signature_timeout, verification will fail. Some changes were also made to signing and verification. There was an error where the whole JSON string was being signed rather than the header combined with the payload. This has been changed to sign the correct thing. Verification has been changed to do this as well, and the unit tests have been updated to reflect these changes. A couple of utility functions have also been added. One decodes a BASE64 string and returns the decoded string, doing all the length calculations for you. The other retrieves a string value from a header in a rdata object. Change-Id: I855f857be3d1c63b64812ac35d9ce0534085b913
2020-05-19 19:46:45 +00:00
ast_sip_session_register_supplement(&stir_shaken_supplement);
return AST_MODULE_LOAD_SUCCESS;
}
#undef AST_BUILDOPT_SUM
#define AST_BUILDOPT_SUM ""
AST_MODULE_INFO(ASTERISK_GPL_KEY, AST_MODFLAG_GLOBAL_SYMBOLS | AST_MODFLAG_LOAD_ORDER,
"PJSIP STIR/SHAKEN Module for Asterisk",
.support_level = AST_MODULE_SUPPORT_CORE,
.load = load_module,
.unload = unload_module,
.load_pri = AST_MODPRI_DEFAULT,
.requires = "res_pjsip,res_pjsip_session,res_stir_shaken",
);