asterisk/main/tcptls.c

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/*
* Asterisk -- An open source telephony toolkit.
*
* Copyright (C) 2007 - 2008, Digium, Inc.
*
* Luigi Rizzo (TCP and TLS server code)
* Brett Bryant <brettbryant@gmail.com> (updated for client support)
*
* See http://www.asterisk.org for more information about
* the Asterisk project. Please do not directly contact
* any of the maintainers of this project for assistance;
* the project provides a web site, mailing lists and IRC
* channels for your use.
*
* This program is free software, distributed under the terms of
* the GNU General Public License Version 2. See the LICENSE file
* at the top of the source tree.
*/
/*!
* \file
* \brief Code to support TCP and TLS server/client
*
* \author Luigi Rizzo
* \author Brett Bryant <brettbryant@gmail.com>
*/
#include "asterisk.h"
#include "asterisk/tcptls.h" /* for ast_tls_config, ast_tcptls_se... */
#include "asterisk/iostream.h" /* for DO_SSL, ast_iostream_close, a... */
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
#include <fcntl.h> /* for O_NONBLOCK */
#endif /* HAVE_FCNTL_H */
#include <netinet/in.h> /* for IPPROTO_TCP */
#ifdef DO_SSL
#include <openssl/asn1.h> /* for ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 */
#include <openssl/crypto.h> /* for OPENSSL_free */
#include <openssl/err.h> /* for ERR_print_errors_fp */
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h> /* for OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD, OPENS... */
#include <openssl/opensslv.h> /* for OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
#include <openssl/safestack.h> /* for STACK_OF */
#include <openssl/ssl.h> /* for SSL_CTX_free, SSL_get_error, ... */
#include <openssl/x509.h> /* for X509_free, X509_NAME_ENTRY_ge... */
#include <openssl/x509v3.h> /* for GENERAL_NAME, sk_GENERAL_NAME... */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/bio.h> /* for BIO_free, BIO_new_file */
#include <openssl/dh.h> /* for DH_free */
#include <openssl/pem.h> /* for PEM_read_bio_DHparams */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
#include <openssl/ec.h> /* for EC_KEY_free, EC_KEY_new_by_cu... */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif /* DO_SSL */
#include <pthread.h> /* for pthread_cancel, pthread_join */
#include <signal.h> /* for pthread_kill, SIGURG */
#include <sys/socket.h> /* for setsockopt, shutdown, socket */
#include <sys/stat.h> /* for stat */
#include "asterisk/app.h" /* for ast_read_textfile */
#include "asterisk/astobj2.h" /* for ao2_ref, ao2_t_ref, ao2_alloc */
#include "asterisk/compat.h" /* for strcasecmp */
#include "asterisk/config.h" /* for ast_parse_arg, ast_parse_flag... */
#include "asterisk/io.h" /* for ast_sd_get_fd */
#include "asterisk/lock.h" /* for AST_PTHREADT_NULL */
#include "asterisk/logger.h" /* for ast_log, LOG_ERROR, ast_debug */
#include "asterisk/netsock2.h" /* for ast_sockaddr_copy, ast_sockad... */
#include "asterisk/pbx.h" /* for ast_thread_inhibit_escalations */
#include "asterisk/utils.h" /* for ast_true, ast_free, ast_wait_... */
static void session_instance_destructor(void *obj)
{
struct ast_tcptls_session_instance *i = obj;
AST-2014-007: Fix DOS by consuming the number of allowed HTTP connections. Simply establishing a TCP connection and never sending anything to the configured HTTP port in http.conf will tie up a HTTP connection. Since there is a maximum number of open HTTP sessions allowed at a time you can block legitimate connections. A similar problem exists if a HTTP request is started but never finished. * Added http.conf session_inactivity timer option to close HTTP connections that aren't doing anything. Defaults to 30000 ms. * Removed the undocumented manager.conf block-sockets option. It interferes with TCP/TLS inactivity timeouts. * AMI and SIP TLS connections now have better authentication timeout protection. Though I didn't remove the bizzare TLS timeout polling code from chan_sip. * chan_sip can now handle SSL certificate renegotiations in the middle of a session. It couldn't do that before because the socket was non-blocking and the SSL calls were not restarted as documented by the OpenSSL documentation. * Fixed an off nominal leak of the ssl struct in handle_tcptls_connection() if the FILE stream failed to open and the SSL certificate negotiations failed. The patch creates a custom FILE stream handler to give the created FILE streams inactivity timeout and timeout after a specific moment in time capability. This approach eliminates the need for code using the FILE stream to be redesigned to deal with the timeouts. This patch indirectly fixes most of ASTERISK-18345 by fixing the usage of the SSL_read/SSL_write operations. ASTERISK-23673 #close Reported by: Richard Mudgett ........ Merged revisions 415841 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/1.8 ........ Merged revisions 415854 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/11 ........ Merged revisions 415896 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/12 git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@415907 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2014-06-12 17:00:08 +00:00
if (i->stream) {
ast_iostream_close(i->stream);
i->stream = NULL;
AST-2014-007: Fix DOS by consuming the number of allowed HTTP connections. Simply establishing a TCP connection and never sending anything to the configured HTTP port in http.conf will tie up a HTTP connection. Since there is a maximum number of open HTTP sessions allowed at a time you can block legitimate connections. A similar problem exists if a HTTP request is started but never finished. * Added http.conf session_inactivity timer option to close HTTP connections that aren't doing anything. Defaults to 30000 ms. * Removed the undocumented manager.conf block-sockets option. It interferes with TCP/TLS inactivity timeouts. * AMI and SIP TLS connections now have better authentication timeout protection. Though I didn't remove the bizzare TLS timeout polling code from chan_sip. * chan_sip can now handle SSL certificate renegotiations in the middle of a session. It couldn't do that before because the socket was non-blocking and the SSL calls were not restarted as documented by the OpenSSL documentation. * Fixed an off nominal leak of the ssl struct in handle_tcptls_connection() if the FILE stream failed to open and the SSL certificate negotiations failed. The patch creates a custom FILE stream handler to give the created FILE streams inactivity timeout and timeout after a specific moment in time capability. This approach eliminates the need for code using the FILE stream to be redesigned to deal with the timeouts. This patch indirectly fixes most of ASTERISK-18345 by fixing the usage of the SSL_read/SSL_write operations. ASTERISK-23673 #close Reported by: Richard Mudgett ........ Merged revisions 415841 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/1.8 ........ Merged revisions 415854 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/11 ........ Merged revisions 415896 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/12 git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@415907 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2014-06-12 17:00:08 +00:00
}
ast_free(i->overflow_buf);
ao2_cleanup(i->private_data);
}
#ifdef DO_SSL
static int check_tcptls_cert_name(ASN1_STRING *cert_str, const char *hostname, const char *desc)
{
unsigned char *str;
int ret;
ret = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&str, cert_str);
if (ret < 0 || !str) {
return -1;
}
if (strlen((char *) str) != ret) {
ast_log(LOG_WARNING, "Invalid certificate %s length (contains NULL bytes?)\n", desc);
ret = -1;
} else if (!strcasecmp(hostname, (char *) str)) {
ret = 0;
} else {
ret = -1;
}
ast_debug(3, "SSL %s compare s1='%s' s2='%s'\n", desc, hostname, str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
return ret;
}
static void write_openssl_error_to_log(void)
{
FILE *fp;
char *buffer;
size_t length;
fp = open_memstream(&buffer, &length);
if (!fp) {
return;
}
ERR_print_errors_fp(fp);
fclose(fp);
if (length) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "%.*s\n", (int) length, buffer);
}
ast_std_free(buffer);
}
#endif
/*! \brief
* creates a FILE * from the fd passed by the accept thread.
* This operation is potentially expensive (certificate verification),
* so we do it in the child thread context.
*
* \note must decrement ref count before returning NULL on error
*/
SIP TCP/TLS: move client connection setup/write into tcp helper thread, various related locking/memory fixes. What this patch fixes 1.Moves sip TCP/TLS connection setup into the TCP helper thread: Connection setup takes awhile and before this it was being done while holding the monitor lock. 2.Moves TCP/TLS writing to the TCP helper thread: Through the use of a packet queue and an alert pipe, the TCP helper thread can now be woken up to write data as well as read data. 3.Locking error: sip_xmit returned an XMIT_ERROR without giving up the tcptls_session lock. This lock has been completely removed from sip_xmit and placed in the new sip_tcptls_write() function. 4.Memory leak: When creating a tcptls_client the tls_cfg was alloced but never freed unless the tcptls_session failed to start. Now the session_args for a sip client are an ao2 object which frees the tls_cfg on destruction. 5.Pointer to stack variable: During sip_prepare_socket the creation of a client's ast_tcptls_session_args was done on the stack and stored as a pointer in the newly created tcptls_session. Depending on the events that followed, there was a slight possibility that pointer could have been accessed after the stack returned. Given the new changes, it is always accessed after the stack returns which is why I found it. Notable code changes 1.I broke tcptls.c's ast_tcptls_client_start() function into two functions. One for creating and allocating the new tcptls_session, and a separate one for starting and handling the new connection. This allowed me to create the tcptls_session, launch the helper thread, and then establish the connection within the helper thread. 2.Writes to a tcptls_session are now done within the helper thread. This is done by using an alert pipe to wake up the thread if new data needs to be sent. The thread's sip_threadinfo object contains the alert pipe as well as the packet queue. 3.Since the threadinfo object contains the alert pipe, it must now be accessed outside of the helper thread for every write (queuing of a packet). For easy lookup, I moved the threadinfo objects from a linked list to an ao2_container. (closes issue #13136) Reported by: pabelanger Tested by: dvossel, whys (closes issue #15894) Reported by: dvossel Tested by: dvossel Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/380/ git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@225445 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2009-10-22 19:55:51 +00:00
static void *handle_tcptls_connection(void *data)
{
struct ast_tcptls_session_instance *tcptls_session = data;
#ifdef DO_SSL
SSL *ssl;
#endif
/* TCP/TLS connections are associated with external protocols, and
* should not be allowed to execute 'dangerous' functions. This may
* need to be pushed down into the individual protocol handlers, but
* this seems like a good general policy.
*/
if (ast_thread_inhibit_escalations()) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Failed to inhibit privilege escalations; killing connection from peer '%s'\n",
ast_sockaddr_stringify(&tcptls_session->remote_address));
ast_tcptls_close_session_file(tcptls_session);
ao2_ref(tcptls_session, -1);
return NULL;
}
/*
* TCP/TLS connections are associated with external protocols which can
* be considered to be user interfaces (even for SIP messages), and
* will not handle channel media. This may need to be pushed down into
* the individual protocol handlers, but this seems like a good start.
*/
if (ast_thread_user_interface_set(1)) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Failed to set user interface status; killing connection from peer '%s'\n",
ast_sockaddr_stringify(&tcptls_session->remote_address));
ast_tcptls_close_session_file(tcptls_session);
ao2_ref(tcptls_session, -1);
return NULL;
}
if (tcptls_session->parent->tls_cfg) {
#ifdef DO_SSL
if (ast_iostream_start_tls(&tcptls_session->stream, tcptls_session->parent->tls_cfg->ssl_ctx, tcptls_session->client) < 0) {
SSL *ssl = ast_iostream_get_ssl(tcptls_session->stream);
if (ssl) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Unable to set up ssl connection with peer '%s'\n",
ast_sockaddr_stringify(&tcptls_session->remote_address));
}
ast_tcptls_close_session_file(tcptls_session);
ao2_ref(tcptls_session, -1);
return NULL;
}
AST-2014-007: Fix DOS by consuming the number of allowed HTTP connections. Simply establishing a TCP connection and never sending anything to the configured HTTP port in http.conf will tie up a HTTP connection. Since there is a maximum number of open HTTP sessions allowed at a time you can block legitimate connections. A similar problem exists if a HTTP request is started but never finished. * Added http.conf session_inactivity timer option to close HTTP connections that aren't doing anything. Defaults to 30000 ms. * Removed the undocumented manager.conf block-sockets option. It interferes with TCP/TLS inactivity timeouts. * AMI and SIP TLS connections now have better authentication timeout protection. Though I didn't remove the bizzare TLS timeout polling code from chan_sip. * chan_sip can now handle SSL certificate renegotiations in the middle of a session. It couldn't do that before because the socket was non-blocking and the SSL calls were not restarted as documented by the OpenSSL documentation. * Fixed an off nominal leak of the ssl struct in handle_tcptls_connection() if the FILE stream failed to open and the SSL certificate negotiations failed. The patch creates a custom FILE stream handler to give the created FILE streams inactivity timeout and timeout after a specific moment in time capability. This approach eliminates the need for code using the FILE stream to be redesigned to deal with the timeouts. This patch indirectly fixes most of ASTERISK-18345 by fixing the usage of the SSL_read/SSL_write operations. ASTERISK-23673 #close Reported by: Richard Mudgett ........ Merged revisions 415841 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/1.8 ........ Merged revisions 415854 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/11 ........ Merged revisions 415896 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/12 git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@415907 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2014-06-12 17:00:08 +00:00
ssl = ast_iostream_get_ssl(tcptls_session->stream);
if ((tcptls_session->client && !ast_test_flag(&tcptls_session->parent->tls_cfg->flags, AST_SSL_DONT_VERIFY_SERVER))
|| (!tcptls_session->client && ast_test_flag(&tcptls_session->parent->tls_cfg->flags, AST_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT))) {
X509 *peer;
long res;
peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
if (!peer) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "No SSL certificate to verify from peer '%s'\n",
ast_sockaddr_stringify(&tcptls_session->remote_address));
ast_tcptls_close_session_file(tcptls_session);
ao2_ref(tcptls_session, -1);
return NULL;
}
res = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);
if (res != X509_V_OK) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Certificate from peer '%s' did not verify: %s\n",
ast_sockaddr_stringify(&tcptls_session->remote_address),
X509_verify_cert_error_string(res));
X509_free(peer);
ast_tcptls_close_session_file(tcptls_session);
ao2_ref(tcptls_session, -1);
return NULL;
}
if (!ast_test_flag(&tcptls_session->parent->tls_cfg->flags, AST_SSL_IGNORE_COMMON_NAME)) {
ASN1_STRING *str;
X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(peer);
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *alt_names;
int pos = -1;
int found = 0;
for (;;) {
/* Walk the certificate to check all available "Common Name" */
/* XXX Probably should do a gethostbyname on the hostname and compare that as well */
pos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, pos);
if (pos < 0) {
break;
}
str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name, pos));
if (!check_tcptls_cert_name(str, tcptls_session->parent->hostname, "common name")) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
alt_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(peer, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
if (alt_names != NULL) {
int alt_names_count = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(alt_names);
for (pos = 0; pos < alt_names_count; pos++) {
const GENERAL_NAME *alt_name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(alt_names, pos);
if (alt_name->type != GEN_DNS) {
continue;
}
if (!check_tcptls_cert_name(alt_name->d.dNSName, tcptls_session->parent->hostname, "alt name")) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(alt_names, GENERAL_NAME_free);
}
}
if (!found) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Certificate common name from peer '%s' did not match (%s)\n",
ast_sockaddr_stringify(&tcptls_session->remote_address), tcptls_session->parent->hostname);
X509_free(peer);
ast_tcptls_close_session_file(tcptls_session);
ao2_ref(tcptls_session, -1);
return NULL;
}
}
X509_free(peer);
}
#else
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "TLS client failed: Asterisk is compiled without OpenSSL support. Install OpenSSL development headers and rebuild Asterisk after running ./configure\n");
ast_tcptls_close_session_file(tcptls_session);
ao2_ref(tcptls_session, -1);
return NULL;
#endif /* DO_SSL */
}
if (tcptls_session->parent->worker_fn) {
return tcptls_session->parent->worker_fn(tcptls_session);
} else {
return tcptls_session;
}
}
void *ast_tcptls_server_root(void *data)
{
struct ast_tcptls_session_args *desc = data;
int fd;
struct ast_sockaddr addr;
struct ast_tcptls_session_instance *tcptls_session;
pthread_t launched;
for (;;) {
int i;
if (desc->periodic_fn) {
desc->periodic_fn(desc);
}
i = ast_wait_for_input(desc->accept_fd, desc->poll_timeout);
if (i <= 0) {
/* Prevent tight loop from hogging CPU */
usleep(1);
continue;
}
fd = ast_accept(desc->accept_fd, &addr);
if (fd < 0) {
if (errno != EAGAIN
&& errno != EWOULDBLOCK
&& errno != EINTR
&& errno != ECONNABORTED) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "TCP/TLS accept failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
if (errno != EMFILE) {
break;
}
}
/* Prevent tight loop from hogging CPU */
usleep(1);
continue;
}
tcptls_session = ao2_alloc(sizeof(*tcptls_session), session_instance_destructor);
if (!tcptls_session) {
close(fd);
continue;
}
tcptls_session->overflow_buf = ast_str_create(128);
if (!tcptls_session->overflow_buf) {
ao2_ref(tcptls_session, -1);
close(fd);
continue;
}
ast_fd_clear_flags(fd, O_NONBLOCK);
tcptls_session->stream = ast_iostream_from_fd(&fd);
if (!tcptls_session->stream) {
ao2_ref(tcptls_session, -1);
close(fd);
continue;
}
tcptls_session->parent = desc;
ast_sockaddr_copy(&tcptls_session->remote_address, &addr);
tcptls_session->client = 0;
/* This thread is now the only place that controls the single ref to tcptls_session */
SIP TCP/TLS: move client connection setup/write into tcp helper thread, various related locking/memory fixes. What this patch fixes 1.Moves sip TCP/TLS connection setup into the TCP helper thread: Connection setup takes awhile and before this it was being done while holding the monitor lock. 2.Moves TCP/TLS writing to the TCP helper thread: Through the use of a packet queue and an alert pipe, the TCP helper thread can now be woken up to write data as well as read data. 3.Locking error: sip_xmit returned an XMIT_ERROR without giving up the tcptls_session lock. This lock has been completely removed from sip_xmit and placed in the new sip_tcptls_write() function. 4.Memory leak: When creating a tcptls_client the tls_cfg was alloced but never freed unless the tcptls_session failed to start. Now the session_args for a sip client are an ao2 object which frees the tls_cfg on destruction. 5.Pointer to stack variable: During sip_prepare_socket the creation of a client's ast_tcptls_session_args was done on the stack and stored as a pointer in the newly created tcptls_session. Depending on the events that followed, there was a slight possibility that pointer could have been accessed after the stack returned. Given the new changes, it is always accessed after the stack returns which is why I found it. Notable code changes 1.I broke tcptls.c's ast_tcptls_client_start() function into two functions. One for creating and allocating the new tcptls_session, and a separate one for starting and handling the new connection. This allowed me to create the tcptls_session, launch the helper thread, and then establish the connection within the helper thread. 2.Writes to a tcptls_session are now done within the helper thread. This is done by using an alert pipe to wake up the thread if new data needs to be sent. The thread's sip_threadinfo object contains the alert pipe as well as the packet queue. 3.Since the threadinfo object contains the alert pipe, it must now be accessed outside of the helper thread for every write (queuing of a packet). For easy lookup, I moved the threadinfo objects from a linked list to an ao2_container. (closes issue #13136) Reported by: pabelanger Tested by: dvossel, whys (closes issue #15894) Reported by: dvossel Tested by: dvossel Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/380/ git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@225445 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2009-10-22 19:55:51 +00:00
if (ast_pthread_create_detached_background(&launched, NULL, handle_tcptls_connection, tcptls_session)) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "TCP/TLS unable to launch helper thread for peer '%s': %s\n",
ast_sockaddr_stringify(&tcptls_session->remote_address),
strerror(errno));
ao2_ref(tcptls_session, -1);
}
}
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "TCP/TLS listener thread ended abnormally\n");
/* Close the listener socket so Asterisk doesn't appear dead. */
fd = desc->accept_fd;
desc->accept_fd = -1;
if (0 <= fd) {
close(fd);
}
return NULL;
}
#ifdef DO_SSL
static void __ssl_setup_certs(struct ast_tls_config *cfg, const size_t cert_file_len, const char *key_type_extension, const char *key_type)
{
char *cert_file = ast_strdupa(cfg->certfile);
memcpy(cert_file + cert_file_len - 8, key_type_extension, 5);
if (access(cert_file, F_OK) == 0) {
if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(cfg->ssl_ctx, cert_file) == 0) {
ast_log(LOG_WARNING, "TLS/SSL error loading public %s key (certificate) from <%s>.\n", key_type, cert_file);
write_openssl_error_to_log();
} else if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(cfg->ssl_ctx, cert_file, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) == 0) {
ast_log(LOG_WARNING, "TLS/SSL error loading private %s key from <%s>.\n", key_type, cert_file);
write_openssl_error_to_log();
} else if (SSL_CTX_check_private_key(cfg->ssl_ctx) == 0) {
ast_log(LOG_WARNING, "TLS/SSL error matching private %s key and certificate in <%s>.\n", key_type, cert_file);
write_openssl_error_to_log();
}
}
}
#endif
static int __ssl_setup(struct ast_tls_config *cfg, int client)
{
#ifndef DO_SSL
if (cfg->enabled) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "TLS server failed: Asterisk is compiled without OpenSSL support. Install OpenSSL development headers and rebuild Asterisk after running ./configure\n");
cfg->enabled = 0;
}
return 0;
#else
AST-2014-011: Fix POODLE security issues There are two aspects to the vulnerability: (1) res_jabber/res_xmpp use SSLv3 only. This patch updates the module to use TLSv1+. At this time, it does not refactor res_jabber/res_xmpp to use the TCP/TLS core, which should be done as an improvement at a latter date. (2) The TCP/TLS core, when tlsclientmethod/sslclientmethod is left unspecified, will default to the OpenSSL SSLv23_method. This method allows for all ecnryption methods, including SSLv2/SSLv3. A MITM can exploit this by forcing a fallback to SSLv3, which leaves the server vulnerable to POODLE. This patch adds WARNINGS if a user uses SSLv2/SSLv3 in their configuration, and explicitly disables SSLv2/SSLv3 if using SSLv23_method. For TLS clients, Asterisk will default to TLSv1+ and WARN if SSLv2 or SSLv3 is explicitly chosen. For TLS servers, Asterisk will no longer support SSLv2 or SSLv3. Much thanks to abelbeck for reporting the vulnerability and providing a patch for the res_jabber/res_xmpp modules. Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/4096/ ASTERISK-24425 #close Reported by: abelbeck Tested by: abelbeck, opsmonitor, gtjoseph patches: asterisk-1.8-jabber-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) asterisk-11-jabber-xmpp-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) AST-2014-011-1.8.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) AST-2014-011-11.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) ........ Merged revisions 425987 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/12 ........ Merged revisions 425991 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/13 git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@426003 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2014-10-20 14:20:15 +00:00
int disable_ssl = 0;
long ssl_opts = 0;
if (!cfg->enabled) {
return 0;
}
/* Get rid of an old SSL_CTX since we're about to
* allocate a new one
*/
if (cfg->ssl_ctx) {
SSL_CTX_free(cfg->ssl_ctx);
cfg->ssl_ctx = NULL;
}
if (client) {
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
if (ast_test_flag(&cfg->flags, AST_SSL_SSLV2_CLIENT)) {
AST-2014-011: Fix POODLE security issues There are two aspects to the vulnerability: (1) res_jabber/res_xmpp use SSLv3 only. This patch updates the module to use TLSv1+. At this time, it does not refactor res_jabber/res_xmpp to use the TCP/TLS core, which should be done as an improvement at a latter date. (2) The TCP/TLS core, when tlsclientmethod/sslclientmethod is left unspecified, will default to the OpenSSL SSLv23_method. This method allows for all ecnryption methods, including SSLv2/SSLv3. A MITM can exploit this by forcing a fallback to SSLv3, which leaves the server vulnerable to POODLE. This patch adds WARNINGS if a user uses SSLv2/SSLv3 in their configuration, and explicitly disables SSLv2/SSLv3 if using SSLv23_method. For TLS clients, Asterisk will default to TLSv1+ and WARN if SSLv2 or SSLv3 is explicitly chosen. For TLS servers, Asterisk will no longer support SSLv2 or SSLv3. Much thanks to abelbeck for reporting the vulnerability and providing a patch for the res_jabber/res_xmpp modules. Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/4096/ ASTERISK-24425 #close Reported by: abelbeck Tested by: abelbeck, opsmonitor, gtjoseph patches: asterisk-1.8-jabber-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) asterisk-11-jabber-xmpp-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) AST-2014-011-1.8.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) AST-2014-011-11.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) ........ Merged revisions 425987 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/12 ........ Merged revisions 425991 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/13 git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@426003 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2014-10-20 14:20:15 +00:00
ast_log(LOG_WARNING, "Usage of SSLv2 is discouraged due to known vulnerabilities. Please use 'tlsv1' or leave the TLS method unspecified!\n");
cfg->ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2_client_method());
} else
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD) && !(defined(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT) && (OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x10100000L))
if (ast_test_flag(&cfg->flags, AST_SSL_SSLV3_CLIENT)) {
AST-2014-011: Fix POODLE security issues There are two aspects to the vulnerability: (1) res_jabber/res_xmpp use SSLv3 only. This patch updates the module to use TLSv1+. At this time, it does not refactor res_jabber/res_xmpp to use the TCP/TLS core, which should be done as an improvement at a latter date. (2) The TCP/TLS core, when tlsclientmethod/sslclientmethod is left unspecified, will default to the OpenSSL SSLv23_method. This method allows for all ecnryption methods, including SSLv2/SSLv3. A MITM can exploit this by forcing a fallback to SSLv3, which leaves the server vulnerable to POODLE. This patch adds WARNINGS if a user uses SSLv2/SSLv3 in their configuration, and explicitly disables SSLv2/SSLv3 if using SSLv23_method. For TLS clients, Asterisk will default to TLSv1+ and WARN if SSLv2 or SSLv3 is explicitly chosen. For TLS servers, Asterisk will no longer support SSLv2 or SSLv3. Much thanks to abelbeck for reporting the vulnerability and providing a patch for the res_jabber/res_xmpp modules. Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/4096/ ASTERISK-24425 #close Reported by: abelbeck Tested by: abelbeck, opsmonitor, gtjoseph patches: asterisk-1.8-jabber-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) asterisk-11-jabber-xmpp-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) AST-2014-011-1.8.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) AST-2014-011-11.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) ........ Merged revisions 425987 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/12 ........ Merged revisions 425991 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/13 git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@426003 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2014-10-20 14:20:15 +00:00
ast_log(LOG_WARNING, "Usage of SSLv3 is discouraged due to known vulnerabilities. Please use 'tlsv1' or leave the TLS method unspecified!\n");
cfg->ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method());
} else
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
cfg->ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method());
#else
if (ast_test_flag(&cfg->flags, AST_SSL_TLSV1_CLIENT)) {
cfg->ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_client_method());
} else {
AST-2014-011: Fix POODLE security issues There are two aspects to the vulnerability: (1) res_jabber/res_xmpp use SSLv3 only. This patch updates the module to use TLSv1+. At this time, it does not refactor res_jabber/res_xmpp to use the TCP/TLS core, which should be done as an improvement at a latter date. (2) The TCP/TLS core, when tlsclientmethod/sslclientmethod is left unspecified, will default to the OpenSSL SSLv23_method. This method allows for all ecnryption methods, including SSLv2/SSLv3. A MITM can exploit this by forcing a fallback to SSLv3, which leaves the server vulnerable to POODLE. This patch adds WARNINGS if a user uses SSLv2/SSLv3 in their configuration, and explicitly disables SSLv2/SSLv3 if using SSLv23_method. For TLS clients, Asterisk will default to TLSv1+ and WARN if SSLv2 or SSLv3 is explicitly chosen. For TLS servers, Asterisk will no longer support SSLv2 or SSLv3. Much thanks to abelbeck for reporting the vulnerability and providing a patch for the res_jabber/res_xmpp modules. Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/4096/ ASTERISK-24425 #close Reported by: abelbeck Tested by: abelbeck, opsmonitor, gtjoseph patches: asterisk-1.8-jabber-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) asterisk-11-jabber-xmpp-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) AST-2014-011-1.8.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) AST-2014-011-11.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) ........ Merged revisions 425987 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/12 ........ Merged revisions 425991 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/13 git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@426003 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2014-10-20 14:20:15 +00:00
disable_ssl = 1;
cfg->ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
}
#endif
} else {
AST-2014-011: Fix POODLE security issues There are two aspects to the vulnerability: (1) res_jabber/res_xmpp use SSLv3 only. This patch updates the module to use TLSv1+. At this time, it does not refactor res_jabber/res_xmpp to use the TCP/TLS core, which should be done as an improvement at a latter date. (2) The TCP/TLS core, when tlsclientmethod/sslclientmethod is left unspecified, will default to the OpenSSL SSLv23_method. This method allows for all ecnryption methods, including SSLv2/SSLv3. A MITM can exploit this by forcing a fallback to SSLv3, which leaves the server vulnerable to POODLE. This patch adds WARNINGS if a user uses SSLv2/SSLv3 in their configuration, and explicitly disables SSLv2/SSLv3 if using SSLv23_method. For TLS clients, Asterisk will default to TLSv1+ and WARN if SSLv2 or SSLv3 is explicitly chosen. For TLS servers, Asterisk will no longer support SSLv2 or SSLv3. Much thanks to abelbeck for reporting the vulnerability and providing a patch for the res_jabber/res_xmpp modules. Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/4096/ ASTERISK-24425 #close Reported by: abelbeck Tested by: abelbeck, opsmonitor, gtjoseph patches: asterisk-1.8-jabber-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) asterisk-11-jabber-xmpp-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) AST-2014-011-1.8.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) AST-2014-011-11.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) ........ Merged revisions 425987 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/12 ........ Merged revisions 425991 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/13 git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@426003 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2014-10-20 14:20:15 +00:00
disable_ssl = 1;
cfg->ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
}
if (!cfg->ssl_ctx) {
ast_debug(1, "Sorry, SSL_CTX_new call returned null...\n");
cfg->enabled = 0;
return 0;
}
AST-2014-011: Fix POODLE security issues There are two aspects to the vulnerability: (1) res_jabber/res_xmpp use SSLv3 only. This patch updates the module to use TLSv1+. At this time, it does not refactor res_jabber/res_xmpp to use the TCP/TLS core, which should be done as an improvement at a latter date. (2) The TCP/TLS core, when tlsclientmethod/sslclientmethod is left unspecified, will default to the OpenSSL SSLv23_method. This method allows for all ecnryption methods, including SSLv2/SSLv3. A MITM can exploit this by forcing a fallback to SSLv3, which leaves the server vulnerable to POODLE. This patch adds WARNINGS if a user uses SSLv2/SSLv3 in their configuration, and explicitly disables SSLv2/SSLv3 if using SSLv23_method. For TLS clients, Asterisk will default to TLSv1+ and WARN if SSLv2 or SSLv3 is explicitly chosen. For TLS servers, Asterisk will no longer support SSLv2 or SSLv3. Much thanks to abelbeck for reporting the vulnerability and providing a patch for the res_jabber/res_xmpp modules. Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/4096/ ASTERISK-24425 #close Reported by: abelbeck Tested by: abelbeck, opsmonitor, gtjoseph patches: asterisk-1.8-jabber-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) asterisk-11-jabber-xmpp-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) AST-2014-011-1.8.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) AST-2014-011-11.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) ........ Merged revisions 425987 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/12 ........ Merged revisions 425991 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/13 git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@426003 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2014-10-20 14:20:15 +00:00
/* Due to the POODLE vulnerability, completely disable
* SSLv2 and SSLv3 if we are not explicitly told to use
* them. SSLv23_*_method supports TLSv1+.
*/
if (disable_ssl) {
ssl_opts |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
}
if (ast_test_flag(&cfg->flags, AST_SSL_SERVER_CIPHER_ORDER)) {
ssl_opts |= SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
}
AST-2014-011: Fix POODLE security issues There are two aspects to the vulnerability: (1) res_jabber/res_xmpp use SSLv3 only. This patch updates the module to use TLSv1+. At this time, it does not refactor res_jabber/res_xmpp to use the TCP/TLS core, which should be done as an improvement at a latter date. (2) The TCP/TLS core, when tlsclientmethod/sslclientmethod is left unspecified, will default to the OpenSSL SSLv23_method. This method allows for all ecnryption methods, including SSLv2/SSLv3. A MITM can exploit this by forcing a fallback to SSLv3, which leaves the server vulnerable to POODLE. This patch adds WARNINGS if a user uses SSLv2/SSLv3 in their configuration, and explicitly disables SSLv2/SSLv3 if using SSLv23_method. For TLS clients, Asterisk will default to TLSv1+ and WARN if SSLv2 or SSLv3 is explicitly chosen. For TLS servers, Asterisk will no longer support SSLv2 or SSLv3. Much thanks to abelbeck for reporting the vulnerability and providing a patch for the res_jabber/res_xmpp modules. Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/4096/ ASTERISK-24425 #close Reported by: abelbeck Tested by: abelbeck, opsmonitor, gtjoseph patches: asterisk-1.8-jabber-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) asterisk-11-jabber-xmpp-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) AST-2014-011-1.8.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) AST-2014-011-11.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) ........ Merged revisions 425987 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/12 ........ Merged revisions 425991 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/13 git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@426003 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2014-10-20 14:20:15 +00:00
if (ast_test_flag(&cfg->flags, AST_SSL_DISABLE_TLSV1)) {
ssl_opts |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
AST-2014-011: Fix POODLE security issues There are two aspects to the vulnerability: (1) res_jabber/res_xmpp use SSLv3 only. This patch updates the module to use TLSv1+. At this time, it does not refactor res_jabber/res_xmpp to use the TCP/TLS core, which should be done as an improvement at a latter date. (2) The TCP/TLS core, when tlsclientmethod/sslclientmethod is left unspecified, will default to the OpenSSL SSLv23_method. This method allows for all ecnryption methods, including SSLv2/SSLv3. A MITM can exploit this by forcing a fallback to SSLv3, which leaves the server vulnerable to POODLE. This patch adds WARNINGS if a user uses SSLv2/SSLv3 in their configuration, and explicitly disables SSLv2/SSLv3 if using SSLv23_method. For TLS clients, Asterisk will default to TLSv1+ and WARN if SSLv2 or SSLv3 is explicitly chosen. For TLS servers, Asterisk will no longer support SSLv2 or SSLv3. Much thanks to abelbeck for reporting the vulnerability and providing a patch for the res_jabber/res_xmpp modules. Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/4096/ ASTERISK-24425 #close Reported by: abelbeck Tested by: abelbeck, opsmonitor, gtjoseph patches: asterisk-1.8-jabber-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) asterisk-11-jabber-xmpp-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) AST-2014-011-1.8.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) AST-2014-011-11.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) ........ Merged revisions 425987 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/12 ........ Merged revisions 425991 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/13 git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@426003 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2014-10-20 14:20:15 +00:00
}
#if defined(SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && defined(SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)
if (ast_test_flag(&cfg->flags, AST_SSL_DISABLE_TLSV11)) {
ssl_opts |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
}
if (ast_test_flag(&cfg->flags, AST_SSL_DISABLE_TLSV12)) {
ssl_opts |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
}
#else
ast_log(LOG_WARNING, "Your version of OpenSSL leaves you potentially vulnerable "
"to the SSL BEAST attack. Please upgrade to OpenSSL 1.0.1 or later\n");
#endif
SSL_CTX_set_options(cfg->ssl_ctx, ssl_opts);
AST-2014-011: Fix POODLE security issues There are two aspects to the vulnerability: (1) res_jabber/res_xmpp use SSLv3 only. This patch updates the module to use TLSv1+. At this time, it does not refactor res_jabber/res_xmpp to use the TCP/TLS core, which should be done as an improvement at a latter date. (2) The TCP/TLS core, when tlsclientmethod/sslclientmethod is left unspecified, will default to the OpenSSL SSLv23_method. This method allows for all ecnryption methods, including SSLv2/SSLv3. A MITM can exploit this by forcing a fallback to SSLv3, which leaves the server vulnerable to POODLE. This patch adds WARNINGS if a user uses SSLv2/SSLv3 in their configuration, and explicitly disables SSLv2/SSLv3 if using SSLv23_method. For TLS clients, Asterisk will default to TLSv1+ and WARN if SSLv2 or SSLv3 is explicitly chosen. For TLS servers, Asterisk will no longer support SSLv2 or SSLv3. Much thanks to abelbeck for reporting the vulnerability and providing a patch for the res_jabber/res_xmpp modules. Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/4096/ ASTERISK-24425 #close Reported by: abelbeck Tested by: abelbeck, opsmonitor, gtjoseph patches: asterisk-1.8-jabber-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) asterisk-11-jabber-xmpp-tls.patch uploaded by abelbeck (License 5903) AST-2014-011-1.8.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) AST-2014-011-11.diff uploaded by mjordan (License 6283) ........ Merged revisions 425987 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/12 ........ Merged revisions 425991 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/13 git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@426003 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2014-10-20 14:20:15 +00:00
SSL_CTX_set_verify(cfg->ssl_ctx,
ast_test_flag(&cfg->flags, AST_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT) ? SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT : SSL_VERIFY_NONE,
NULL);
if (!ast_strlen_zero(cfg->certfile)) {
char *tmpprivate = ast_strlen_zero(cfg->pvtfile) ? cfg->certfile : cfg->pvtfile;
if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(cfg->ssl_ctx, cfg->certfile) == 0) {
if (!client) {
/* Clients don't need a certificate, but if its setup we can use it */
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "TLS/SSL error loading cert file. <%s>\n", cfg->certfile);
write_openssl_error_to_log();
cfg->enabled = 0;
SSL_CTX_free(cfg->ssl_ctx);
cfg->ssl_ctx = NULL;
return 0;
}
}
if ((SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(cfg->ssl_ctx, tmpprivate, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) == 0) || (SSL_CTX_check_private_key(cfg->ssl_ctx) == 0 )) {
if (!client) {
/* Clients don't need a private key, but if its setup we can use it */
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "TLS/SSL error loading private key file. <%s>\n", tmpprivate);
write_openssl_error_to_log();
cfg->enabled = 0;
SSL_CTX_free(cfg->ssl_ctx);
cfg->ssl_ctx = NULL;
return 0;
}
}
if (!client) {
size_t certfile_len = strlen(cfg->certfile);
/* expects a file name which contains _rsa. like asterisk_rsa.pem
* ignores any 3-character file-extension like .pem, .cer, .crt
*/
if (certfile_len >= 8 && !strncmp(cfg->certfile + certfile_len - 8, "_rsa.", 5)) {
__ssl_setup_certs(cfg, certfile_len, "_ecc.", "ECC");
__ssl_setup_certs(cfg, certfile_len, "_dsa.", "DSA");
}
}
}
if (!ast_strlen_zero(cfg->cipher)) {
if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(cfg->ssl_ctx, cfg->cipher) == 0 ) {
if (!client) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "TLS/SSL cipher error <%s>\n", cfg->cipher);
write_openssl_error_to_log();
cfg->enabled = 0;
SSL_CTX_free(cfg->ssl_ctx);
cfg->ssl_ctx = NULL;
return 0;
}
}
}
if (!ast_strlen_zero(cfg->cafile) || !ast_strlen_zero(cfg->capath)) {
if (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(cfg->ssl_ctx, S_OR(cfg->cafile, NULL), S_OR(cfg->capath,NULL)) == 0) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "TLS/SSL CA file(%s)/path(%s) error\n", cfg->cafile, cfg->capath);
write_openssl_error_to_log();
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (!ast_strlen_zero(cfg->pvtfile)) {
BIO *bio = BIO_new_file(cfg->pvtfile, "r");
if (bio != NULL) {
DH *dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (dh != NULL) {
if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(cfg->ssl_ctx, dh)) {
long options = SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE | SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE | SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE;
options = SSL_CTX_set_options(cfg->ssl_ctx, options);
ast_verb(2, "TLS/SSL DH initialized, PFS cipher-suites enabled\n");
}
DH_free(dh);
}
BIO_free(bio);
}
}
#endif
#ifndef SSL_CTRL_SET_ECDH_AUTO
#define SSL_CTRL_SET_ECDH_AUTO 94
#endif
/* SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(cfg->ssl_ctx, on); requires OpenSSL 1.0.2 which wraps: */
if (SSL_CTX_ctrl(cfg->ssl_ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_ECDH_AUTO, 1, NULL)) {
ast_verb(2, "TLS/SSL ECDH initialized (automatic), faster PFS ciphers enabled\n");
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10000000L) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
} else {
/* enables AES-128 ciphers, to get AES-256 use NID_secp384r1 */
EC_KEY *ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
if (ecdh != NULL) {
if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(cfg->ssl_ctx, ecdh)) {
ast_verb(2, "TLS/SSL ECDH initialized (secp256r1), faster PFS cipher-suites enabled\n");
}
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
}
#endif
}
ast_verb(2, "TLS/SSL certificate ok\n"); /* We should log which one that is ok. This message doesn't really make sense in production use */
return 1;
#endif
}
int ast_ssl_setup(struct ast_tls_config *cfg)
{
return __ssl_setup(cfg, 0);
}
void ast_ssl_teardown(struct ast_tls_config *cfg)
{
#ifdef DO_SSL
if (cfg && cfg->ssl_ctx) {
SSL_CTX_free(cfg->ssl_ctx);
cfg->ssl_ctx = NULL;
}
#endif
}
/*!
* \internal
* \brief Connect a socket
*
* Attempt to connect to a given address for up to 'timeout' milliseconds. A negative
* timeout value equates to an infinite wait time.
*
* A -1 is returned on error, and an appropriate errno value is set based on the
* type of error.
*
* \param sockfd The socket file descriptor
* \param addr The address to connect to
* \param timeout How long, in milliseconds, to attempt to connect
*
* \return 0 if successfully connected, -1 otherwise
*/
static int socket_connect(int sockfd, const struct ast_sockaddr *addr, int timeout)
{
int optval = 0;
socklen_t optlen = sizeof(int);
errno = 0;
if (ast_connect(sockfd, addr)) {
int res;
/*
* A connect failure could mean things are still in progress.
* If so wait for it to complete.
*/
if (errno != EINPROGRESS) {
return -1;
}
while ((res = ast_wait_for_output(sockfd, timeout)) != 1) {
if (res == 0) {
errno = ETIMEDOUT;
return -1;
}
if (errno != EINTR) {
return -1;
}
}
}
/* Check the status to ensure it actually connected successfully */
if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, &optlen) < 0) {
return -1;
}
if (optval) {
errno = optval;
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
struct ast_tcptls_session_instance *ast_tcptls_client_start_timeout(
struct ast_tcptls_session_instance *tcptls_session, int timeout)
{
SIP TCP/TLS: move client connection setup/write into tcp helper thread, various related locking/memory fixes. What this patch fixes 1.Moves sip TCP/TLS connection setup into the TCP helper thread: Connection setup takes awhile and before this it was being done while holding the monitor lock. 2.Moves TCP/TLS writing to the TCP helper thread: Through the use of a packet queue and an alert pipe, the TCP helper thread can now be woken up to write data as well as read data. 3.Locking error: sip_xmit returned an XMIT_ERROR without giving up the tcptls_session lock. This lock has been completely removed from sip_xmit and placed in the new sip_tcptls_write() function. 4.Memory leak: When creating a tcptls_client the tls_cfg was alloced but never freed unless the tcptls_session failed to start. Now the session_args for a sip client are an ao2 object which frees the tls_cfg on destruction. 5.Pointer to stack variable: During sip_prepare_socket the creation of a client's ast_tcptls_session_args was done on the stack and stored as a pointer in the newly created tcptls_session. Depending on the events that followed, there was a slight possibility that pointer could have been accessed after the stack returned. Given the new changes, it is always accessed after the stack returns which is why I found it. Notable code changes 1.I broke tcptls.c's ast_tcptls_client_start() function into two functions. One for creating and allocating the new tcptls_session, and a separate one for starting and handling the new connection. This allowed me to create the tcptls_session, launch the helper thread, and then establish the connection within the helper thread. 2.Writes to a tcptls_session are now done within the helper thread. This is done by using an alert pipe to wake up the thread if new data needs to be sent. The thread's sip_threadinfo object contains the alert pipe as well as the packet queue. 3.Since the threadinfo object contains the alert pipe, it must now be accessed outside of the helper thread for every write (queuing of a packet). For easy lookup, I moved the threadinfo objects from a linked list to an ao2_container. (closes issue #13136) Reported by: pabelanger Tested by: dvossel, whys (closes issue #15894) Reported by: dvossel Tested by: dvossel Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/380/ git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@225445 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2009-10-22 19:55:51 +00:00
struct ast_tcptls_session_args *desc;
if (!(desc = tcptls_session->parent)) {
ao2_ref(tcptls_session, -1);
return NULL;
SIP TCP/TLS: move client connection setup/write into tcp helper thread, various related locking/memory fixes. What this patch fixes 1.Moves sip TCP/TLS connection setup into the TCP helper thread: Connection setup takes awhile and before this it was being done while holding the monitor lock. 2.Moves TCP/TLS writing to the TCP helper thread: Through the use of a packet queue and an alert pipe, the TCP helper thread can now be woken up to write data as well as read data. 3.Locking error: sip_xmit returned an XMIT_ERROR without giving up the tcptls_session lock. This lock has been completely removed from sip_xmit and placed in the new sip_tcptls_write() function. 4.Memory leak: When creating a tcptls_client the tls_cfg was alloced but never freed unless the tcptls_session failed to start. Now the session_args for a sip client are an ao2 object which frees the tls_cfg on destruction. 5.Pointer to stack variable: During sip_prepare_socket the creation of a client's ast_tcptls_session_args was done on the stack and stored as a pointer in the newly created tcptls_session. Depending on the events that followed, there was a slight possibility that pointer could have been accessed after the stack returned. Given the new changes, it is always accessed after the stack returns which is why I found it. Notable code changes 1.I broke tcptls.c's ast_tcptls_client_start() function into two functions. One for creating and allocating the new tcptls_session, and a separate one for starting and handling the new connection. This allowed me to create the tcptls_session, launch the helper thread, and then establish the connection within the helper thread. 2.Writes to a tcptls_session are now done within the helper thread. This is done by using an alert pipe to wake up the thread if new data needs to be sent. The thread's sip_threadinfo object contains the alert pipe as well as the packet queue. 3.Since the threadinfo object contains the alert pipe, it must now be accessed outside of the helper thread for every write (queuing of a packet). For easy lookup, I moved the threadinfo objects from a linked list to an ao2_container. (closes issue #13136) Reported by: pabelanger Tested by: dvossel, whys (closes issue #15894) Reported by: dvossel Tested by: dvossel Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/380/ git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@225445 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2009-10-22 19:55:51 +00:00
}
if (socket_connect(desc->accept_fd, &desc->remote_address, timeout)) {
ast_log(LOG_WARNING, "Unable to connect %s to %s: %s\n", desc->name,
ast_sockaddr_stringify(&desc->remote_address), strerror(errno));
ao2_ref(tcptls_session, -1);
return NULL;
SIP TCP/TLS: move client connection setup/write into tcp helper thread, various related locking/memory fixes. What this patch fixes 1.Moves sip TCP/TLS connection setup into the TCP helper thread: Connection setup takes awhile and before this it was being done while holding the monitor lock. 2.Moves TCP/TLS writing to the TCP helper thread: Through the use of a packet queue and an alert pipe, the TCP helper thread can now be woken up to write data as well as read data. 3.Locking error: sip_xmit returned an XMIT_ERROR without giving up the tcptls_session lock. This lock has been completely removed from sip_xmit and placed in the new sip_tcptls_write() function. 4.Memory leak: When creating a tcptls_client the tls_cfg was alloced but never freed unless the tcptls_session failed to start. Now the session_args for a sip client are an ao2 object which frees the tls_cfg on destruction. 5.Pointer to stack variable: During sip_prepare_socket the creation of a client's ast_tcptls_session_args was done on the stack and stored as a pointer in the newly created tcptls_session. Depending on the events that followed, there was a slight possibility that pointer could have been accessed after the stack returned. Given the new changes, it is always accessed after the stack returns which is why I found it. Notable code changes 1.I broke tcptls.c's ast_tcptls_client_start() function into two functions. One for creating and allocating the new tcptls_session, and a separate one for starting and handling the new connection. This allowed me to create the tcptls_session, launch the helper thread, and then establish the connection within the helper thread. 2.Writes to a tcptls_session are now done within the helper thread. This is done by using an alert pipe to wake up the thread if new data needs to be sent. The thread's sip_threadinfo object contains the alert pipe as well as the packet queue. 3.Since the threadinfo object contains the alert pipe, it must now be accessed outside of the helper thread for every write (queuing of a packet). For easy lookup, I moved the threadinfo objects from a linked list to an ao2_container. (closes issue #13136) Reported by: pabelanger Tested by: dvossel, whys (closes issue #15894) Reported by: dvossel Tested by: dvossel Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/380/ git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@225445 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2009-10-22 19:55:51 +00:00
}
ast_fd_clear_flags(desc->accept_fd, O_NONBLOCK);
SIP TCP/TLS: move client connection setup/write into tcp helper thread, various related locking/memory fixes. What this patch fixes 1.Moves sip TCP/TLS connection setup into the TCP helper thread: Connection setup takes awhile and before this it was being done while holding the monitor lock. 2.Moves TCP/TLS writing to the TCP helper thread: Through the use of a packet queue and an alert pipe, the TCP helper thread can now be woken up to write data as well as read data. 3.Locking error: sip_xmit returned an XMIT_ERROR without giving up the tcptls_session lock. This lock has been completely removed from sip_xmit and placed in the new sip_tcptls_write() function. 4.Memory leak: When creating a tcptls_client the tls_cfg was alloced but never freed unless the tcptls_session failed to start. Now the session_args for a sip client are an ao2 object which frees the tls_cfg on destruction. 5.Pointer to stack variable: During sip_prepare_socket the creation of a client's ast_tcptls_session_args was done on the stack and stored as a pointer in the newly created tcptls_session. Depending on the events that followed, there was a slight possibility that pointer could have been accessed after the stack returned. Given the new changes, it is always accessed after the stack returns which is why I found it. Notable code changes 1.I broke tcptls.c's ast_tcptls_client_start() function into two functions. One for creating and allocating the new tcptls_session, and a separate one for starting and handling the new connection. This allowed me to create the tcptls_session, launch the helper thread, and then establish the connection within the helper thread. 2.Writes to a tcptls_session are now done within the helper thread. This is done by using an alert pipe to wake up the thread if new data needs to be sent. The thread's sip_threadinfo object contains the alert pipe as well as the packet queue. 3.Since the threadinfo object contains the alert pipe, it must now be accessed outside of the helper thread for every write (queuing of a packet). For easy lookup, I moved the threadinfo objects from a linked list to an ao2_container. (closes issue #13136) Reported by: pabelanger Tested by: dvossel, whys (closes issue #15894) Reported by: dvossel Tested by: dvossel Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/380/ git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@225445 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2009-10-22 19:55:51 +00:00
if (desc->tls_cfg) {
desc->tls_cfg->enabled = 1;
__ssl_setup(desc->tls_cfg, 1);
}
return handle_tcptls_connection(tcptls_session);
}
SIP TCP/TLS: move client connection setup/write into tcp helper thread, various related locking/memory fixes. What this patch fixes 1.Moves sip TCP/TLS connection setup into the TCP helper thread: Connection setup takes awhile and before this it was being done while holding the monitor lock. 2.Moves TCP/TLS writing to the TCP helper thread: Through the use of a packet queue and an alert pipe, the TCP helper thread can now be woken up to write data as well as read data. 3.Locking error: sip_xmit returned an XMIT_ERROR without giving up the tcptls_session lock. This lock has been completely removed from sip_xmit and placed in the new sip_tcptls_write() function. 4.Memory leak: When creating a tcptls_client the tls_cfg was alloced but never freed unless the tcptls_session failed to start. Now the session_args for a sip client are an ao2 object which frees the tls_cfg on destruction. 5.Pointer to stack variable: During sip_prepare_socket the creation of a client's ast_tcptls_session_args was done on the stack and stored as a pointer in the newly created tcptls_session. Depending on the events that followed, there was a slight possibility that pointer could have been accessed after the stack returned. Given the new changes, it is always accessed after the stack returns which is why I found it. Notable code changes 1.I broke tcptls.c's ast_tcptls_client_start() function into two functions. One for creating and allocating the new tcptls_session, and a separate one for starting and handling the new connection. This allowed me to create the tcptls_session, launch the helper thread, and then establish the connection within the helper thread. 2.Writes to a tcptls_session are now done within the helper thread. This is done by using an alert pipe to wake up the thread if new data needs to be sent. The thread's sip_threadinfo object contains the alert pipe as well as the packet queue. 3.Since the threadinfo object contains the alert pipe, it must now be accessed outside of the helper thread for every write (queuing of a packet). For easy lookup, I moved the threadinfo objects from a linked list to an ao2_container. (closes issue #13136) Reported by: pabelanger Tested by: dvossel, whys (closes issue #15894) Reported by: dvossel Tested by: dvossel Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/380/ git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@225445 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2009-10-22 19:55:51 +00:00
struct ast_tcptls_session_instance *ast_tcptls_client_start(struct ast_tcptls_session_instance *tcptls_session)
{
return ast_tcptls_client_start_timeout(tcptls_session, -1);
SIP TCP/TLS: move client connection setup/write into tcp helper thread, various related locking/memory fixes. What this patch fixes 1.Moves sip TCP/TLS connection setup into the TCP helper thread: Connection setup takes awhile and before this it was being done while holding the monitor lock. 2.Moves TCP/TLS writing to the TCP helper thread: Through the use of a packet queue and an alert pipe, the TCP helper thread can now be woken up to write data as well as read data. 3.Locking error: sip_xmit returned an XMIT_ERROR without giving up the tcptls_session lock. This lock has been completely removed from sip_xmit and placed in the new sip_tcptls_write() function. 4.Memory leak: When creating a tcptls_client the tls_cfg was alloced but never freed unless the tcptls_session failed to start. Now the session_args for a sip client are an ao2 object which frees the tls_cfg on destruction. 5.Pointer to stack variable: During sip_prepare_socket the creation of a client's ast_tcptls_session_args was done on the stack and stored as a pointer in the newly created tcptls_session. Depending on the events that followed, there was a slight possibility that pointer could have been accessed after the stack returned. Given the new changes, it is always accessed after the stack returns which is why I found it. Notable code changes 1.I broke tcptls.c's ast_tcptls_client_start() function into two functions. One for creating and allocating the new tcptls_session, and a separate one for starting and handling the new connection. This allowed me to create the tcptls_session, launch the helper thread, and then establish the connection within the helper thread. 2.Writes to a tcptls_session are now done within the helper thread. This is done by using an alert pipe to wake up the thread if new data needs to be sent. The thread's sip_threadinfo object contains the alert pipe as well as the packet queue. 3.Since the threadinfo object contains the alert pipe, it must now be accessed outside of the helper thread for every write (queuing of a packet). For easy lookup, I moved the threadinfo objects from a linked list to an ao2_container. (closes issue #13136) Reported by: pabelanger Tested by: dvossel, whys (closes issue #15894) Reported by: dvossel Tested by: dvossel Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/380/ git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@225445 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2009-10-22 19:55:51 +00:00
}
struct ast_tcptls_session_instance *ast_tcptls_client_create(struct ast_tcptls_session_args *desc)
{
int fd, x = 1;
struct ast_tcptls_session_instance *tcptls_session = NULL;
ast_assert(!desc->tls_cfg
|| ast_test_flag(&desc->tls_cfg->flags, AST_SSL_DONT_VERIFY_SERVER)
|| !ast_strlen_zero(desc->hostname));
/* Do nothing if nothing has changed */
if (!ast_sockaddr_cmp(&desc->old_address, &desc->remote_address)) {
ast_debug(1, "Nothing changed in %s\n", desc->name);
return NULL;
}
/* If we return early, there is no connection */
ast_sockaddr_setnull(&desc->old_address);
fd = desc->accept_fd = ast_socket_nonblock(ast_sockaddr_is_ipv6(&desc->remote_address) ?
AF_INET6 : AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (desc->accept_fd < 0) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Unable to allocate socket for %s: %s\n",
desc->name, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
/* if a local address was specified, bind to it so the connection will
originate from the desired address */
if (!ast_sockaddr_isnull(&desc->local_address) &&
!ast_sockaddr_is_any(&desc->local_address)) {
setsockopt(desc->accept_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &x, sizeof(x));
if (ast_bind(desc->accept_fd, &desc->local_address)) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Unable to bind %s to %s: %s\n",
desc->name,
ast_sockaddr_stringify(&desc->local_address),
strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
}
tcptls_session = ao2_alloc(sizeof(*tcptls_session), session_instance_destructor);
if (!tcptls_session) {
goto error;
}
tcptls_session->overflow_buf = ast_str_create(128);
if (!tcptls_session->overflow_buf) {
goto error;
}
SIP TCP/TLS: move client connection setup/write into tcp helper thread, various related locking/memory fixes. What this patch fixes 1.Moves sip TCP/TLS connection setup into the TCP helper thread: Connection setup takes awhile and before this it was being done while holding the monitor lock. 2.Moves TCP/TLS writing to the TCP helper thread: Through the use of a packet queue and an alert pipe, the TCP helper thread can now be woken up to write data as well as read data. 3.Locking error: sip_xmit returned an XMIT_ERROR without giving up the tcptls_session lock. This lock has been completely removed from sip_xmit and placed in the new sip_tcptls_write() function. 4.Memory leak: When creating a tcptls_client the tls_cfg was alloced but never freed unless the tcptls_session failed to start. Now the session_args for a sip client are an ao2 object which frees the tls_cfg on destruction. 5.Pointer to stack variable: During sip_prepare_socket the creation of a client's ast_tcptls_session_args was done on the stack and stored as a pointer in the newly created tcptls_session. Depending on the events that followed, there was a slight possibility that pointer could have been accessed after the stack returned. Given the new changes, it is always accessed after the stack returns which is why I found it. Notable code changes 1.I broke tcptls.c's ast_tcptls_client_start() function into two functions. One for creating and allocating the new tcptls_session, and a separate one for starting and handling the new connection. This allowed me to create the tcptls_session, launch the helper thread, and then establish the connection within the helper thread. 2.Writes to a tcptls_session are now done within the helper thread. This is done by using an alert pipe to wake up the thread if new data needs to be sent. The thread's sip_threadinfo object contains the alert pipe as well as the packet queue. 3.Since the threadinfo object contains the alert pipe, it must now be accessed outside of the helper thread for every write (queuing of a packet). For easy lookup, I moved the threadinfo objects from a linked list to an ao2_container. (closes issue #13136) Reported by: pabelanger Tested by: dvossel, whys (closes issue #15894) Reported by: dvossel Tested by: dvossel Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/380/ git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@225445 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
2009-10-22 19:55:51 +00:00
tcptls_session->client = 1;
tcptls_session->stream = ast_iostream_from_fd(&fd);
if (!tcptls_session->stream) {
goto error;
}
/* From here on out, the iostream owns the accept_fd and it will take
* care of closing it when the iostream is closed */
tcptls_session->parent = desc;
tcptls_session->parent->worker_fn = NULL;
ast_sockaddr_copy(&tcptls_session->remote_address,
&desc->remote_address);
/* Set current info */
ast_sockaddr_copy(&desc->old_address, &desc->remote_address);
return tcptls_session;
error:
close(desc->accept_fd);
desc->accept_fd = -1;
ao2_cleanup(tcptls_session);
return NULL;
}
void ast_tcptls_server_start(struct ast_tcptls_session_args *desc)
{
int x = 1;
int tls_changed = 0;
int sd_socket;
if (desc->tls_cfg) {
char hash[41];
char *str = NULL;
struct stat st;
/* Store the hashes of the TLS certificate etc. */
if (stat(desc->tls_cfg->certfile, &st) || NULL == (str = ast_read_textfile(desc->tls_cfg->certfile))) {
memset(hash, 0, 41);
} else {
ast_sha1_hash(hash, str);
}
ast_free(str);
str = NULL;
memcpy(desc->tls_cfg->certhash, hash, 41);
if (stat(desc->tls_cfg->pvtfile, &st) || NULL == (str = ast_read_textfile(desc->tls_cfg->pvtfile))) {
memset(hash, 0, 41);
} else {
ast_sha1_hash(hash, str);
}
ast_free(str);
str = NULL;
memcpy(desc->tls_cfg->pvthash, hash, 41);
if (stat(desc->tls_cfg->cafile, &st) || NULL == (str = ast_read_textfile(desc->tls_cfg->cafile))) {
memset(hash, 0, 41);
} else {
ast_sha1_hash(hash, str);
}
ast_free(str);
str = NULL;
memcpy(desc->tls_cfg->cahash, hash, 41);
/* Check whether TLS configuration has changed */
if (!desc->old_tls_cfg) { /* No previous configuration */
tls_changed = 1;
desc->old_tls_cfg = ast_calloc(1, sizeof(*desc->old_tls_cfg));
} else if (memcmp(desc->tls_cfg->certhash, desc->old_tls_cfg->certhash, 41)) {
tls_changed = 1;
} else if (memcmp(desc->tls_cfg->pvthash, desc->old_tls_cfg->pvthash, 41)) {
tls_changed = 1;
} else if (strcmp(desc->tls_cfg->cipher, desc->old_tls_cfg->cipher)) {
tls_changed = 1;
} else if (memcmp(desc->tls_cfg->cahash, desc->old_tls_cfg->cahash, 41)) {
tls_changed = 1;
} else if (strcmp(desc->tls_cfg->capath, desc->old_tls_cfg->capath)) {
tls_changed = 1;
} else if (memcmp(&desc->tls_cfg->flags, &desc->old_tls_cfg->flags, sizeof(desc->tls_cfg->flags))) {
tls_changed = 1;
}
if (tls_changed) {
ast_debug(1, "Changed parameters for %s found\n", desc->name);
}
}
/* Do nothing if nothing has changed */
if (!tls_changed && !ast_sockaddr_cmp(&desc->old_address, &desc->local_address)) {
ast_debug(1, "Nothing changed in %s\n", desc->name);
return;
}
/* If we return early, there is no one listening */
ast_sockaddr_setnull(&desc->old_address);
/* Shutdown a running server if there is one */
if (desc->master != AST_PTHREADT_NULL) {
pthread_cancel(desc->master);
pthread_kill(desc->master, SIGURG);
pthread_join(desc->master, NULL);
}
sd_socket = ast_sd_get_fd(SOCK_STREAM, &desc->local_address);
if (sd_socket != -1) {
if (desc->accept_fd != sd_socket) {
if (desc->accept_fd != -1) {
close(desc->accept_fd);
}
desc->accept_fd = sd_socket;
}
goto systemd_socket_activation;
}
if (desc->accept_fd != -1) {
close(desc->accept_fd);
desc->accept_fd = -1;
}
/* If there's no new server, stop here */
if (ast_sockaddr_isnull(&desc->local_address)) {
ast_debug(2, "Server disabled: %s\n", desc->name);
return;
}
desc->accept_fd = ast_socket_nonblock(ast_sockaddr_is_ipv6(&desc->local_address) ?
AF_INET6 : AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (desc->accept_fd < 0) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Unable to allocate socket for %s: %s\n", desc->name, strerror(errno));
return;
}
setsockopt(desc->accept_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &x, sizeof(x));
if (ast_bind(desc->accept_fd, &desc->local_address)) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Unable to bind %s to %s: %s\n",
desc->name,
ast_sockaddr_stringify(&desc->local_address),
strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
if (listen(desc->accept_fd, 10)) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Unable to listen for %s!\n", desc->name);
goto error;
}
systemd_socket_activation:
if (ast_pthread_create_background(&desc->master, NULL, desc->accept_fn, desc)) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Unable to launch thread for %s on %s: %s\n",
desc->name,
ast_sockaddr_stringify(&desc->local_address),
strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
/* Set current info */
ast_sockaddr_copy(&desc->old_address, &desc->local_address);
if (desc->old_tls_cfg) {
ast_free(desc->old_tls_cfg->certfile);
ast_free(desc->old_tls_cfg->pvtfile);
ast_free(desc->old_tls_cfg->cipher);
ast_free(desc->old_tls_cfg->cafile);
ast_free(desc->old_tls_cfg->capath);
desc->old_tls_cfg->certfile = ast_strdup(desc->tls_cfg->certfile);
desc->old_tls_cfg->pvtfile = ast_strdup(desc->tls_cfg->pvtfile);
desc->old_tls_cfg->cipher = ast_strdup(desc->tls_cfg->cipher);
desc->old_tls_cfg->cafile = ast_strdup(desc->tls_cfg->cafile);
desc->old_tls_cfg->capath = ast_strdup(desc->tls_cfg->capath);
memcpy(desc->old_tls_cfg->certhash, desc->tls_cfg->certhash, 41);
memcpy(desc->old_tls_cfg->pvthash, desc->tls_cfg->pvthash, 41);
memcpy(desc->old_tls_cfg->cahash, desc->tls_cfg->cahash, 41);
memcpy(&desc->old_tls_cfg->flags, &desc->tls_cfg->flags, sizeof(desc->old_tls_cfg->flags));
}
return;
error:
close(desc->accept_fd);
desc->accept_fd = -1;
}
void ast_tcptls_close_session_file(struct ast_tcptls_session_instance *tcptls_session)
{
if (tcptls_session->stream) {
ast_iostream_close(tcptls_session->stream);
tcptls_session->stream = NULL;
} else {
ast_debug(1, "ast_tcptls_close_session_file invoked on session instance without file or file descriptor\n");
}
}
void ast_tcptls_server_stop(struct ast_tcptls_session_args *desc)
{
if (desc->master != AST_PTHREADT_NULL) {
pthread_cancel(desc->master);
pthread_kill(desc->master, SIGURG);
pthread_join(desc->master, NULL);
desc->master = AST_PTHREADT_NULL;
}
if (desc->accept_fd != -1) {
close(desc->accept_fd);
}
desc->accept_fd = -1;
if (desc->old_tls_cfg) {
ast_free(desc->old_tls_cfg->certfile);
ast_free(desc->old_tls_cfg->pvtfile);
ast_free(desc->old_tls_cfg->cipher);
ast_free(desc->old_tls_cfg->cafile);
ast_free(desc->old_tls_cfg->capath);
ast_free(desc->old_tls_cfg);
desc->old_tls_cfg = NULL;
}
ast_debug(2, "Stopped server :: %s\n", desc->name);
}
int ast_tls_read_conf(struct ast_tls_config *tls_cfg, struct ast_tcptls_session_args *tls_desc, const char *varname, const char *value)
{
if (!strcasecmp(varname, "tlsenable") || !strcasecmp(varname, "sslenable")) {
tls_cfg->enabled = ast_true(value) ? 1 : 0;
} else if (!strcasecmp(varname, "tlscertfile") || !strcasecmp(varname, "sslcert") || !strcasecmp(varname, "tlscert")) {
ast_free(tls_cfg->certfile);
tls_cfg->certfile = ast_strdup(value);
} else if (!strcasecmp(varname, "tlsprivatekey") || !strcasecmp(varname, "sslprivatekey")) {
ast_free(tls_cfg->pvtfile);
tls_cfg->pvtfile = ast_strdup(value);
} else if (!strcasecmp(varname, "tlscipher") || !strcasecmp(varname, "sslcipher")) {
ast_free(tls_cfg->cipher);
tls_cfg->cipher = ast_strdup(value);
} else if (!strcasecmp(varname, "tlscafile")) {
ast_free(tls_cfg->cafile);
tls_cfg->cafile = ast_strdup(value);
} else if (!strcasecmp(varname, "tlscapath") || !strcasecmp(varname, "tlscadir")) {
ast_free(tls_cfg->capath);
tls_cfg->capath = ast_strdup(value);
} else if (!strcasecmp(varname, "tlsverifyclient")) {
ast_set2_flag(&tls_cfg->flags, ast_true(value), AST_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT);
} else if (!strcasecmp(varname, "tlsdontverifyserver")) {
ast_set2_flag(&tls_cfg->flags, ast_true(value), AST_SSL_DONT_VERIFY_SERVER);
} else if (!strcasecmp(varname, "tlsbindaddr") || !strcasecmp(varname, "sslbindaddr")) {
if (ast_parse_arg(value, PARSE_ADDR, &tls_desc->local_address))
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Invalid %s '%s'\n", varname, value);
} else if (!strcasecmp(varname, "tlsclientmethod") || !strcasecmp(varname, "sslclientmethod")) {
if (!strcasecmp(value, "tlsv1")) {
ast_set_flag(&tls_cfg->flags, AST_SSL_TLSV1_CLIENT);
ast_clear_flag(&tls_cfg->flags, AST_SSL_SSLV3_CLIENT);
ast_clear_flag(&tls_cfg->flags, AST_SSL_SSLV2_CLIENT);
} else if (!strcasecmp(value, "sslv3")) {
ast_set_flag(&tls_cfg->flags, AST_SSL_SSLV3_CLIENT);
ast_clear_flag(&tls_cfg->flags, AST_SSL_SSLV2_CLIENT);
ast_clear_flag(&tls_cfg->flags, AST_SSL_TLSV1_CLIENT);
} else if (!strcasecmp(value, "sslv2")) {
ast_set_flag(&tls_cfg->flags, AST_SSL_SSLV2_CLIENT);
ast_clear_flag(&tls_cfg->flags, AST_SSL_TLSV1_CLIENT);
ast_clear_flag(&tls_cfg->flags, AST_SSL_SSLV3_CLIENT);
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(varname, "tlsservercipherorder")) {
ast_set2_flag(&tls_cfg->flags, ast_true(value), AST_SSL_SERVER_CIPHER_ORDER);
} else if (!strcasecmp(varname, "tlsdisablev1")) {
ast_set2_flag(&tls_cfg->flags, ast_true(value), AST_SSL_DISABLE_TLSV1);
} else if (!strcasecmp(varname, "tlsdisablev11")) {
ast_set2_flag(&tls_cfg->flags, ast_true(value), AST_SSL_DISABLE_TLSV11);
} else if (!strcasecmp(varname, "tlsdisablev12")) {
ast_set2_flag(&tls_cfg->flags, ast_true(value), AST_SSL_DISABLE_TLSV12);
} else {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}