This patch allows individual dialplan functions to be marked as
'dangerous', to inhibit their execution from external sources.
A 'dangerous' function is one which results in a privilege escalation.
For example, if one were to read the channel variable SHELL(rm -rf /)
Bad Things(TM) could happen; even if the external source has only read
permissions.
Execution from external sources may be enabled by setting
'live_dangerously' to 'yes' in the [options] section of asterisk.conf.
Although doing so is not recommended.
Also, the ABI was changed to something more reasonable, since Asterisk
12 does not yet have a public release.
(closes issue ASTERISK-22905)
Review: http://reviewboard.digium.internal/r/432/
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The AMI Originate action can allow a remote user to specify information that can
be used to execute shell commands on the system hosting Asterisk. This can
result in an unwanted escalation of permissions, as the Originate action, which
requires the "originate" class authorization, can be used to perform actions
that would typically require the "system" class authorization. Previous attempts
to prevent this permission escalation (AST-2011-006, AST-2012-004) have sought
to do so by inspecting the names of applications and functions passed in with
the Originate action and, if those applications/functions matched a predefined
set of values, rejecting the command if the user lacked the "system" class
authorization. As noted by IBM X-Force Research, the "ExternalIVR"
application is not listed in the predefined set of values. The solution for
this particular vulnerability is to include the "ExternalIVR" application in the
set of defined applications/functions that require "system" class authorization.
Unfortunately, the approach of inspecting fields in the Originate action against
known applications/functions has a significant flaw. The predefined set of
values can be bypassed by creative use of the Originate action or by certain
dialplan configurations, which is beyond the ability of Asterisk to analyze at
run-time. Attempting to work around these scenarios would result in severely
restricting the applications or functions and prevent their usage for legitimate
means. As such, any additional security vulnerabilities, where an
application/function that would normally require the "system" class
authorization can be executed by users with the "originate" class authorization,
will not be addressed. Instead, the README-SERIOUSLY.bestpractices.txt file has
been updated to reflect that the AMI Originate action can result in commands
requiring the "system" class authorization to be executed. Proper system
configuration can limit the impact of such scenarios.
(closes issue ASTERISK-20132)
Reported by: Zubair Ashraf of IBM X-Force Research
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Rodrigo Ramírez Norambuena
David M. Lee
Matthew Jordan
Leif Madsen